32Red Poker Blog

I’ve had the idea of keeping a running notebook of my biggest mistakes from ‘live’ events. It’s sure to fill up quickly! I hope it will be a useful thing both for me, and for you, the readers, and I’ve love to hear your thoughts on the hands.

So much of poker is about being honest with yourself, and it’s acutally very easy to pinpoint a ton of things you could have done better, even after just a few hours live play. Here we go with the mistakes; they are in chronological order, not in order of severity!

1) Rendezvous Casino Brighton, £500 Freezeout, 11th October 2008.

I had a pretty tough table given that the field looked quite weak, and probably the toughest opponent at the table was Karl Mahrenlohz. I have never been quite able to work out his game, but it is obviously strong. He is a highly rated player, and I even wonder whether he is underrated. It was actually because of his strength, and because he is such a clear thinking player, that I chose him to pull a bluff on him. If someone is exploitable, it does not necessarily mean that they are weak. In this case, it was quite the opposite reason that I chose to pull a play that, to a thinking player, should look really strong, and make it very difficult to call without a super-strong hand. And the mistake? I’m gutted to say it, but I wimped out on the river, and didn’t make the follow through bet.

Blinds were 150/300, and Karl raised to 700 on the CO, and I defended the BB with Q9 offsuit. The great structure meant we were both very deep, with 80BB stacks. The flop came Qx4s3s, giving me the top pair. Karl bet 900, I called, and we saw a blank 5 on the turn. Karl bet 1,200, which was another fairly small bet. I was fairly sure that these smallish bets were for pot control reasons, and that his range was fairly wide. It did seem to suggest, however, that he probably did not have a super-strong hand like a set, as he might try to inflate the pot in that case.

It seeemed a perfect spot to try a rather unsusal move- of turning top pair into a bluff. It seems a fairly dubious move, but the logic behind it is often misunderstood. Many people would say, “but he could have nothing, or could be behind you with JJ or something,” and would argue that by trying to get him to pass hands that can beat our top pair, we are bluffing a very narrow range of hands. This is correct, but it is important to understand, that if I do have him beat, it is a void scenario. Those hands will pass to my river bet, but I would beat them anyway (and I think it is very unliekly he will 3-barrel air).

It is crucially important when you decide to bluff that you pinpoint the kind of hands you are trying to make pass. Here the hands were specifically AQ, KQ, QJ, aces and kings. It may seem like a pretty dubious bluff, but I thought I had the right type of player, and the right situation to worry him enough to make him pass. The plan was to raise to check-raise the turn to 3,200, and then to fire a big bluff on the river. A good, thinking player would reconstruct this pattern, along with my flop call, and find it very difficult to pull out a call.

The check-raise to 3,200 was called, the river a board-pairing 4, and somehow I found myself checking. Karl actually fired out a 4,000 bet, and I made what I am 95% sure was the right pass. (even some missed draws have showdown value, and there is no way he is value betting a weaker hand).

The really disappointing thing about the hand is not so much the failed bluff on the turn, but simply that I failed to follow through the plan I had made in my mind. Poker is a game where you just have to trust your instincts, so it really is disappointing to report that I managed to second guess myself into changing my plan. It’s difficult to say what it was, but I would say was a big part due to feeling tired on the day, and to second-guessing the logic of the bluff. It obviously was not the best river card to bluff (a J, ten, 7 or 6 would have been) but was definitely good enough that I should have continued my plan.

2) Rendezvous Casino Brighton, £500 Freezeout, Saturday 11th October

A new table now, and an opponent who was much less experienced. I was playing a stack of 25,000 and raised to 1,200 with KsQx. The small blind called, and seemed a fairly weak, cally-type player. The flop came Q93, all spades, giving me top pair and the 2nd nut flush draw. My opponent checked unusually quickly; I knew that this meant something, it was just difficult to say what.

However, it probably meant that he was at either end of the range, adn had either flopped nothing, or flopped a flush. This probably means that my rather large bet of 2,500 was probably wrong. This is an importnat type of hand. The extra insurance of the second nut draw means that I can make what I will call a balance play of a flop check- it disguises my hand, and balances both its reasonable strength, and the fact my opponent may have a really big hand. It is actually more suitable if you think your opponent may have a set, as this is the exact hand that he is going to check-raise you big with. My hand was strong in some ways, but was definitely not a spot where I would be happy to get it all in on the flop.

So, that was the first mistake, and now I’ll tell you that my opponent had in fact flopped  a flush, holding J10 of spades. He let me off lightly, echoing my mistake with a flat-call. I  think he has to try to get it in here; any hand that he can trap into betting when he checks on the turn will have to give him action on the flop, so I think this is a really bad trap.

The turn was the 6 of spades, giving me the lead. I decided to check behind; not knowing what his hand was, this is the default play. It both encourages him to bluff the river, and also will help by giving me far less credit when I value bet the end.

The river was a complete blank, and my opponent fired out 3,500 into the 8,800 pot. I made what would be normally a quick, default call (too thin to pass, but raising is too thin for value, and could lead me to getting re-rasie bluffed)and saw that he had flopped the jack high flush.

And the mistake? I acted far too quickly on the end. I really should not have made the defualt move, without thinking about the type of opponent.  I could be sure that he would not re-raise as a bluff, and so only needed to judge whether it would more likely he had a lower flush and would pay me off, or had the ace-high flush. If he did have a lower flush, I think he probably would have made the mistake of calling, particuarly after the frustration of flopping it and seeing it semi-counterfeited. In fact, there is a case for making a big raise; I could have got even of 9,000 more from a suspicious player, and so maybe missed big value.

3) Thanet GUKPT, £1000 Main Event, 18th October 2008

I had quite a weak table to start in the 7-seat.; as is often the case, this involved most pots being limped into, often by multiple players. The 2-seat was the player limping into most pots, often with real junk, and I had been able to get a decent read on his betting patterns, as he had already been involved in some big hands. The main read involved the fact that he had actually flopped the nuts three times, and checked it each time, twice in fact then also checking the turn out of position.

With blinds of 75/150, he limped UTG, and I made it 700 on the CO. He was the sole caller, and this really did not narrow his range much at all. (Pot 1,550, my stack 8,000). The flop came 1098 rainbow, giving me top pair, top kicker on this connected board. He led out into me for 1,500. I was pretty sure he wasn’t the type to mix things up, and so this bet was pretty transparent. There was just no way he had a big hand after the previous three softplays, but at the same time I was pretty sure he wasn’t bluffing. Actually, across all his range from nuts to ouright bluff, it was pretty obvious he was in one specific part- the weak pair with straight draw. (Hands like Q10,J9,J8, and Q9 were the most likely contenders). It was just possible he had 98 for the bottom two pair, but I think he would be clueless enough to consider this a hand worthy of trapping. What was absolutely clear was that he was not stronger than this.

I think my mistake in the hand was that I really should have moved in here, as 3,050 would be a decent enough pot to pick up. The probelm was of course that I might not pick up the pot, and could well find myself sweating the 9 outs of Q9, or 13 outs of J8 for all my stack. Because I had position and a decent read on his range, I chose to flat-call, but I think now I should have moved in. It would have given me a shot of picking up 3,000 for free, or I could be in a more favorable spot if his hand included a ten.

My other reason for flat-calling was that of course it then gives you more options on the turn. The spot you hope for is of course that a blank comes, and now you can move in with much better equity, denying your opponent the odds to call (which admittedly he would have on the flop.) Now, a weak heart still doesn’t like to be called by j9 with one card to come, but you at least have the numbers in your favour.

I flat-called the flop bet, and the turn paired the 8 on the board. This is of course in some senses a good card for my ace-ten, and could well be a blank. Of course, if it is not a blank, it has just given him trips, and is a disaster card. Hands like J8, 87 and Q8 were definitely well weighted in his range. My big regret in the hand is that when he checked, it was quite quickly. I just maybe should have picked up on this, and chosen to check behind.

So, what happened? I fell for the check, and bet a pot controlling 1,600. There was some long pause before he then moved-in, but it looked much more like Hollywooding than indecison with jack-ten. His move in would cost me 4,950 more,  and I gave it some thought before making the inevitable pass. Against this player, it was pass I feel almost 100% confident about, but of course there is the lingering worry that he (accidentally) pulled a great semi-bluff.

Given the hand again, I would most definitely make the same pass on the turn to his all-in, but of course this is one of two worries. I probably should have checked the turn behind (difficult, as it of course gives a free card to q10,J10,Q9,J9,j8,97 and 77 amongst others), and then a blank river would make it easy to use his bet size to get the pass/call decision right, or to find the right value bet if he checked. The other element of the hand for me is whether I should bite the bullet and move in on the flop, and I’d love to hear your thoughts about this. I know that part of my game is that I maybe am a little too reluctant to gamble. Should I just not worry and be prepared to takea  60-40% early in the comp? Let me know your thoughts.

4) Thanet GUKPT, £100 Main Event, 18th October, 2008

I’m going to log this hand because it just didn’t feel right, but I find it difficult to know what exactly I would have done differently. I just know I should have done something different, as it was disappoiting to get so little value from a big hand.

With blinds of 25/50, I completed the small blind with Js4s, and we were five way to the flop. All the other players were non-tricky, and two in this hand fairly big calling stations. The flop came a wonderful 7s6s5s, giving me a flush, and open ended straight flush draw.

First to speak, I bet out 200, called by one recreational player who seemed to favour the call button much more than the fold.  The turn and river came the blanks which were an offsuit queen and an offsuit deuce (final board qx7s6s5s2x), and I bet first 400, and then 1,100. There seemed to be the best value making this big value bet on the end, as I figured that there was little difference between the range of hands that the player would pass for 600 and pass for 1,100. The player actually made a pretty quick pass on the end, a hand which looked then like the busted nut flush draw.

So, a few questions to myself, and I’d love to hear your thoughts on how to play a big hand first to speak into so many limpers.

- Should I have played for a check-raise, which could gain extra value if a bet is made and called by one or two other players? My usual style is to bet out- I guess it can itself gain extra value if my bet is called in one or two spots before being raised.

- If it is right to bet, should I be making much larger bets on the flop and turn? This is something I’m wondering about more and more, as the average live players seem to be farily unaware of how much is in the pot.

-Should I check the river, in case he wants to bluff the busted draw? I think I’m probably right to bet, as it’s so likely he’ll pay off a pot sized bet with any piece. I think the check is only right against an aggressive player who will not only bluff a busted, but value bet a hand like KsQx.

5) Thanet GUKPT, £1000 Main Event, 18th October, 2008

This hand is another example of a cowardly missed bluff. What is wrong with me?! Here’s the hand:

Blinds are 100/200, and I complete the small blind with king-queen. The big blind is  Liv Boveree, and she checks. The kind of a player she is is key to why it was a mistake not to bluff- she is a very good player, but much more towards the conserative end of the spectrum than the reckless. Crucially, she is not the type to call down light over multiple streets.

The flop comes JJ8, and I check. This is my preferred option here, as basically you want to be the one with the option of the re-raise, rather than facing it. Liv made a rather nervous looking bet of 300, and called my re-raise to 800. To simplify slightly, it was now a certainity that she had one of two hands- an eight, or 109 for the straight draw.

Here is what happened, followed by what should have happened! The turn came a 5, and I checked. She bet 600, which was a slight surprise, and I called, knowing that I was either ahead, or drawing to six outs. The river came a 9 (for a board of JJ859), we checked it down, and she took the pot down with 85.

Knowing that she had either an 8 or a straight draw, I should of course have followed with another bluff on the turn. A two-thirds pot bet of 1,400 would have done; she is too good to call with a straight draw on a paired board.

Even after my missed bluff on the turn, I should have bluffed the river. This is much more thin, but after the turn action I think I can conclude it much more likely that she has an 8 than a straight draw. I could either just turn on the heat with a pot bet of 2,000 or represent 109,for a straight draw turning into a pair, and I think the best line is to do this with a smallish 800 bet.

6) Thanet GUPKT, £1000 Main Event, 18th October 2008

Once again Liv Boveree benefited from my poor play, in a pot where I should have used my image of her to make a better decision on the turn:

(Blinds 150/300)

I raise to 800 from the SB with Jd8d, she calls from the BB.

(Flop KcKhJc, I pair the jack)

I check, she bets 1,100, I call

(Turn 7h, a blank)

I check, she bets 2,500, I call

(River 2d)

Check-check, she shows KQo for a winning three of a kind.

I think I should have saved 2,500 from a poor turn call in this pot. Once again, I am guilty of making the standard play, and not asking myself “would this type of opponent really bluff in this spot?” The problem in the hand is that when she bets flop and turn, one of two unlikely things has happened. Liv is a good but solid player, and when she bets the turn, she has either made an unlikely second bluff with nothing, or she has a king for three of a kind. If she does have the king, she has made the unusual play of betting the flop after hitting such a strong hand.

Her flop play is of course correct, as my check after the pre-flop raise probably means that I have a hand that I want to call with, but don’t want to bet. In fact, it screams that I have a jack. However, most players would not make this play on the flop, as they incorrectly believe that the right strategy with their hand is to slow-play. I really should have read that Liv was far more likely to be firing two barrels with a king or AJ than she was with no hand. The situation on the flop is an interesting journey into the psychology of her play, but it is one I should have got right. I may well be wrong, but I would say Liv is betting here with three kings because she is solid, and wants to protect her hand, but good enough to realsie that this is the best way to get value from it. The element of her game that maybe over worries about protecting hands is proved her check behind on the end. I really should have picked up long before this hand that she plays with this style, and should have found a pass on the turn.

7) Thanet GUKPT, £1000 Main Event, Final Hand

I had brought bacsk 26250 for the second day, and on this hand right at the end of the first level, found myself blinded down to 18,700. The hand was interesting both in two ways; firstly reading table dynamics, and secondly the challenge of trying to read someone’s else style of play at this stage of the tournament, where the re-raise all-in becomes a real feature.

My eliminator was Simon “Aces” Trumper, a really strong player, but one whose style was possible to get some insight to. This was partly because his attitude seemed to be very similar to mine, that he would go out of his way to avoid the 50-50% gamble for all his chips. He had been involved in two of the three previous pots, and both would yield a big clue for this pot, where I ultimately busted out.

  Firstly, an interesting hand had created both alot of discussion and good banter, with Mike Ellis eventually calling the clock on himself! Simon “Aces” Trumper held pocket tens in the small blind, and had decided not to move in before the flop to Ellis’ hijack raise, even though the stack size would have fitted perfectly for the re-shove. In stead, he moved in OOP when the flop produced no ace or king. It isa move that I really like as it does alot to reduce the variance of tournament play (Ellis incidentally folded pocket nines with seconds left on the clock, a well considered read confirming his class)

Two hands later, Trumper had then raised UTG +1, been called by Ellis on the button, and had the small blind shove all-in. He had some odds to make the call for a big pot, but eventually chose to pass.

The reason I have given details of these two hands is that they not only give an insight into his style, but change the dynamics of what may happen in subsequent hands. In particular, the last hand can be of great importance to the current one, and a question you should always ask yourself when a player is involved in two consecutive hands is “What happened to this player in the last hand, and how is it likely to affect this one?”

Proceeding to the hand in question, “Aces” limped UTG for 1,600, and an unknown player limped to the right of me in the CO. With blinds of 800/1,600 (100), this meant there was the pot already contained 6,500 chips, a decent fraction of my 18,700 stack. In this scenario, I will often be willing to push. My ace-ten is not a hand I love in this spot (as if you get caught, you will never have the two live cards that, say, 98 suited may offer), but it was deinitely better for the push than a random hand. 

My decision would of course hinge on the read I had on the hands of the two players to my right. With the guy on my right limping behind, he was surely just looking for the chance to play a cheap pot, and so I would need a good think about Trumper. TWo things seemed to be in my favour; he did not like to gamble pre-flop, but principally he had been forced to lay down after raising in the previous pot. This meant that, if he had found a super-strong hand on this hand, he would surely have raised. This is a feature of every player’s game, whatever their style, and combines the two emotions of ”well, I was frustrated that they re-raised last time, but now let’s hope that they do it again.”

As I was able to eliminate a big pair from Trumper’s range, it seemed ripe for the  move in. Within the next thirty seconds, however, he had quickly shipped it, turned ace king, and I was getting on my bike back to Birmingham. (Of course the board had also come out without a ten, but those days are long gone!)

I have thought alot about the hand , and realised my mistake. My thinking was right on one level, but I failed to consider a whole second level of thought. It was fair to elimiate aces, kings and queens from Trumper’s range, but having done that, I should have thought “Well, what is it that Simon is limping with if it is not one of those hands?”

Simon Trumper is very skilled, but also very solid. This is important to know, as it would probably mean that the frustration of being re-raised out of the previous pot might make him now fold some hands that he might sometimes limp with. I had taken off the top off his range before moving in, but had not stopped to realise that I should maybe taken off the bottom as well.

I do not know whether I realistically could have guessed this at the time, but there was a big clue that he might have in fact have exactly ace-king. I should have thought of it like this- Simon has shown that he likes to avoid 50-50% races, and may be frustrated about being re-raised off the previous hand. Therefore, he could well be pulling a really strong move, which is the limp with ace-king in early position, intending then to re-raise all in, if there is a raiser. Now, you can be the on forcing the decision onto 1010 and 99, rather than facing that decision with ace-king yourself.

There probably could have been other weaker hands he might have limped with, but I should at least given the danger hand of ace-king the biggest weighting in his range.

It was a big lesson for me that I shouldn’t make any decisions based on a positive factor, before I have taken the time to consider whether there are any more worrying factors to build in. 

wp ”Aces,” gg nh fu wong to me.

8) £100 Rebuy tournament,Birmingham Broadway, 20th October 2008

One day on, this hand is still tilllting me hard. I had an opportunity to make a sick laydown, but of course politely refused it. The really interesting thing about the hand, though, is about table talk- I’ll come to that in a bit.

I had been lucky and was playing the big stack, and a  Scouse player raised the 50/100 blinds to 625 after one player limped in. I called with AsQs on the button, as did the EP limper, creating a pot of 2025. The Scouser was  a crafty agressive player, buthis one fault seemed to be that after lots of tricky aggresion he would slowplay his big hands, which must be a mistake; he was playing a stack of circa 7,500.

The flop came Ac3c3x, giving me top pair with the 2nd best kicker. Check from the EP limper, the Scouser checked, and I made a small bet of 500. The early position player went all in for 1,900, which I was ready to snap. The Liverpudlian, however,  quickly flat-called the 1,900 all-in of the third player.

This of course was cause for thought, especially because the speed of it did not look like a pocket pair under the ace. The play looked really strong. The one thing that bothered me is that this would not be the way for a typical live player to play ace-king (although it would be a good play, as this flop is so strong for ace-king that it is a contender for a slow-play). If he did not have AK, his range to beat me was very narrow!However, it just felt that he was really strong, and I nearly did the right thing by passing. Of course some little noise went off in my head about a club flush draw, and I made the call.

The turn came an eight of hearts,a complete blank, and the Scouser now checked. He was playing 5,600 behind. The check was good, and gave mean opportunity tobet a small 1,600, both to get value from my hand if I was ahead, and also to be able to escape from the hand if he re-raised.

As soon as I bet 1,600, the Scouser went all-in for the last 4,000. It felt like an easy pass. There was just no way he was playing a hand like AQ,AJ or A10 in this way, and the side pot meant I could be sure he was not playing a flush draw aggressively.

I was near enough sure I would pass, but said to the guy “You must have ace-king?” The reply came “I’ll give you a £100 side bet I don’t have ace-king mate.” I was then able to pass in a flash, and could not believe someone would think this was a clever thing to say with a super-strong hand. I presumed he would flip two aces, but actually had ace-three for a flopped house. (The river comically came the case ace, which would have split the pot. Sick.)

So,I’m gutted with myself for not making a good pass on the flop, but the interesting thing for me is the transparency of the table talk. I normally don’t say too much on the big decisions, but the two times I have, my opponent’s answer had been as kind as a sudden gust of wind revealing his cards. The big lesson for me is a note to self- on any big decision, ask them a question or two; it can do no harm, and might produce a gift.

9) Irish Winter Festival, 1,500 Euro Main Event, Saturday 25th October

Dublin was such a disappointing event, as it is difficult to say really what went wrong. There were definitely a couple of interesting spots, that I maybe could have played better to make a difference in my chip count:

My starting table was weak, especially after the early departure of Julian Thew. I raised up the 8c6c to 750, and a weak Irish player called in the small blind. He was playing a fairly standard game, and I had a pretty reliable tell for when he was weak, as he had pulled a big bluff about a half hour before, and pratically written it all over his face.

(Pot 1,800) The flop came Ad8h4c, giving me the middle pair, and backdraw flush draw. The Irish player thought for  a few seconds (hard to draw too much from, but I thought it more likely he had something), and decided to check.

My mistake was that I checked behind here, and should have made what is a fairly standard continuation bet. There are so few hands genuine hands that he will re-raise with here, and I do not need to worry about him making a play with a draw. The most likely hands, like AQ,AJ and 98, are the exact hands that he will flat call with, and then let me slow down.

In stead, I let the situation become a whole lot more confusing. The board rolled out A86510, and I was faced with bets on 1,200 on the turn and river. I could not pass on the turn, but made what I am 95% sure is the correct pass on the river. Once again, however, there is just a slight chance that an unlikely bluff meant that I made a horrific pass.

It is important for me to think WHY I made the mistake I did in this hand. I think it has to do with not making the transistion well between onlien cash games and live tournaments, where the standard is much weaker. In online cash games, a continuation bet is more risky with a hand like middle pair, as there is a decent chance that your opponent will try to take you off the hand with nothing. Realistically, this is just not the case against avergae opponents in these live tournaments, and this really was a horrible check.

10) Irish Winter Festival, 1,500 Euro Main Event, Saturday 25th October

When you are trying to choose the right value bet with a big hand and your opponent calls within two seconds, you have almost certainly made a mistake. This is what happened in this hand:

(Blinds 50/100)

I raise to 250 in MP with 8d6d, call from the small blind.

(Flop AdKs7d, giving me a low flush draw)

I bet 350, my opponent calls.

(Turn 2d, giving me a low flush)

My opponent bets 1,000, I call                 

(River 6h, a great blank card)            (Pot is 3,300)

My opponent checks, I bet 2,000.  He calls, and shows AQ, no diamond.

This was a strange way for my opponent to play his ace-queen. It was confusing for meon the turn, as I had reason to worry that he might have a flush, but far less confusing when he checked on the river. Now, it looked very much like he had a two pair hand (most logically a turned two pair), or a hand like AQ, with the queen of diamonds. He actually had a different hand, but either way it was pretty clear that I was value betting with the best hand.

I actually thought that 2,000 was a big value bet, but this hand is a good example of a theme that seems to come up again and agian against mediocre live players. When you are fairly sure that you have the best hand, and your opponent has a half decent hand, I just wonder whether the best line is to make a really big value bet. There are just so many opponents that can’t get away from any decent hand, and especially when they have put so many chips into the pot. The other crucial factor here is that my opponent has created a confusing situation for himself by betting the turn so strongly, and then checking the end. (It maybe is not even a horrible call for him, as it is possible that I c-bet the flop with air, and picked up the nut flush draw on the turn). When a weak opponent is confused, they are far more likely to press the call button.

Given the scenario again, I think I would make a value bet of 3,000,but I just wonder whether a bet as big as 5,000 or even 6,000 might show a profit in the long run.

This topic of value betting with the best hand is one that I will try to keep running in this column, and it will be interesting after a period of time to look back at a collection of these type of hands.

11) Irish Winter Festival, 1,500 Euro Main Event, Saturday 25th October

This hand is an example of making the wrong choice with the best hand on the river, when you are faced with the choice of value betting your hand, or turning it into a bluff catcher. My opponent was a young German player, and had the most game of anyone at a weak table. He was without doubt a product of internet generation, as he had the strong aggressive game to show for it. However, he was probably a relative newcomer, as his raw talent had holes in it, including the tendency to construct some pretty bad bluffs. Here is the pot where I should have given him the opportunity to make another:

He raises to 300 from the EP, I call with KQo in the BB.

(Flop Ks10d3c, giving me top pair) Check-check

(Turn 9c, for a heavy drawing board with two clubs) I bet 500- he makes a very quick call

(River 5h, a great blank card) I value bet 1,000- he makes a very quick pass

This decision of whether to value bet or bluff catch is one that you will be faced with time and time again. On a board of K109xx, I am far more likely to choose the value bet than on K10xxx. This is because my opponent’s turn call is more likely to be with a pair and gutshot, a hand that he will just check behind with showdown value.

I think the reason behind too many of my mistakes at the moment is that I am making the standard internet play, when the live environment offers so many more clues. The big clue here my the young German’s overly quick call on the turn, which was a big indication of a drawing hand. The scenario was actually perfect for making a trap check, and I am gutted to have misread the situation.

12) 888 UK Poker Open, £3000 TV Crapshoot

This really was the kind of day where it felt like I had little chance to make a mark on the scoreboard, partly due to the shocking structure of these events. However, it is exactly on this kind of day that itis important ot try to get every little edge right. Here with go with a couple of ones I should have got better today:

With blinds of 2000/4000, and a 100,000 starting stack, I raise to 10,000 with the 7s6s on the button. The big blind, an Austrian player who had played a tight solid game, made the call. Here is how the pot unfolded:

Flop Js3d2s, (giving me the flush draw) check-check

Turn 7s (givng me the second pair and a flush draw) The Austrian bet a confident looking 9,000, and I called.

River 9s (giving me the flush, pot stands at 40,000) The Austrian made an unusally quick check. I bet 18,000, he called and showed a rivered set of nines(!)

Of course it was a real disappointment to only take 9 big blinds in a pot where the river produced a card much better than I had even realised. I’ll try to tackle the issue of what I should have done in two seperate parts, firstly ignoring the fact that the ultra-quick check definitely provided some kind of clue.

The most simple way of building a bigger pot is of course to make the more usual play of betting my flush draw on the flop, or re-raising the turn when I pick up a pair as well. The reason on the turn was more simple- I have good showdown value and very few hands I can raise him off- but the flop is more debatable. The reason for betting a small flush draw on the flop is much more to take it down there than it is to build a pot. The reason I didn’t do this was that I thought this player was simple enough to let me take it off him on the turn and river. Checking behind on the flop of course also disguises your hand very well, if you do hit the flush.

So should I bet 36k(nearly the pot) on the end, rather than the 18k I bet? The answer is of largely obvious- I should do if there is more than better than half of the chance of getting a call than there is for 36k. So, what hands can call for 18k, but can’t for 36k? Here’s a rough estimation of the hands in either group

18k- A set, any two pair (J9,97,J7 the only realistic ones), hands with a jack (AJ,KJ,QJ,J10), 50% chance for A9,98,109, 87 and 76.

36k- A set, and any two pair, and possibly ace-jack.

There probably are more than double the number of hands in the 18k group, so without any another information, I think my value bet of 18k probably was right here.

However, should the extra information of the bizarrely quick check have given me  a reason to change my evaluation. This is the area of my game that I need to improve- not just picking up on physical signs at the table, but correctly reading what they mean. The thing I should have thought about more from the quick check was that something had happened with that 9 of spades. As much as a conclusion like that he has rivered a set or a flush is explained by the quick check, it does not fit well with the simple fact that he has checked. To be honest, the check with the set of nines is bizarre and probably wrong (he should bet to get value from all the hands he beats), but should I have had read his hand for exactly what it was? I would say it was neither a scared check or a trap check, but a wierd combination of the two.

 I just wonder that, just like with Simon Trumper’s ace-king last week, I should have worked out the kind of middling hand that would explain the strange move. Here,the quick check seemed unlikely with a rivered flush, but unlikely also with a hand like AJ, so maybe I should have been able to read that 9 of spades had read him in this more unpredictable way. Let’s have another look at some figures, and see what hands might produce this reaction on the river, and whether they would call either value bet:

A flush (calls for 18k and 36k, and of course almost definitely beats me!)

A set of nines- (calls for both)

Two pair (J9 or 97)- Calls for 18k, and 80% sure he calls for 36k

A9,98 or 87 (hands he bluffed with on the turn)- Calls 80% for 18k, not for 36k

So, if I can be sure that the check promises that the 9s has specifically hits his hand, it looks like I shouldbe firing a bigger value bet. This of course depends on the likelyhood that he has checked a flush, as I lose to 95%+ of his flushes. It would seem there is a complication that he check-raises with a flush, but this does acutally not matter- as long as I am sure I am passing to a back raise even after my 18k bet.

 There really are three hands (99,J9 and 97) that I’m focusing my reason on to potenitally bet 36k. There are 28 combinations of a flush, but of course more than one combination for each of the 99,J9 and 97 hands. There are 3 for the 99, nine for 97 and nine for J9, making a total of 21. I’m going to weight likelyhoods by making it twice as likely that he has made this quick check with the hands with a nine, making a total of 42.

To look at the other hands (A9,98 and 87), there are 12 combinations of these hands, and I’m actually going to weight them as 1/2 as likely as the flush, to call it 6 combinations, for a total of 12.

I won’t do this too often, but here is just a little bit of maths to work out my +EV from both bets.

If I bet 18k

I gain 80% of 18k (14.4k) from 12 combinations of (A9,98,87),  for 172.8k 

I gain 18k from 42 combinations of (99,97,J9), for 756k

I lose 18k to 28 combinations of a flush, for -504k

This makes an equity of 324.8k

If I bet 36k

I gain 36k from 6 sets of nines, for 108k

I gain 80% of 36k (28.8k) from 36 lots of  (J9,97) 916.8k

I lose 36k to 24 combinations of a flush, for -844k

Making an equity of  180.8k

Interesting stuff, the numbers do say that 18k was the right value bet.I know this maths is very rudimentary, and of course is not the whole answer, but it’sn interesting sometimes to do a little bit of number crunching like this.

Of course, the perfect poker game wouldn’t need maths at all. If I could know that he had hit the nine for a set or two pair, and would not do that with a flush, I could of course make the much bigger value bet. This is the goal I want to achieve, rather than these complicated numbers, but it’s interesting just sometimes to have a look.

13) £500 Star City tournament, 1st Novmeber 2008, 8th place finish

This tournament ended with an 8th place finish after two days’ poker, giving me my longest run for a while. This of course means that there is a longer list of mistakes than usual: Here we go:

One of the common themes of the tournament was that I seemedto get my value betting wrong when I did hit a big hand. Here are the examples when I was disappointed with what I collected when I made a big hand:

A) Blinds 25/50, 1st blind level

I held 10c8c in the big blind. An avergae tight player made it 350 UTG+1, and I made the call, along with UTG player and one mid position player.

(Pot 1425, Flop jc9×7x, giving me the nut straight!)

I checked, the initial raiser bet 400, and I check raised to 1,100. Both other players got out of the way, and he made the call.

(Pot 3625, turn KcJc9×7x, giving me also a flush draw)

I bet 1,900 and my opponent passed.

I think on this action board, I should be leading out into the betting to try nto squeeze the UTG player. With only a 10,000 starting stack, it does not need to be too big, but a bet of about 700 might have been best.

B) Second day, blinds 2,000/4,000 (400),

My stack was circa 120k, and I was in the big blind with 10d2c. A player called Graham Lamb made the call in mid position,  the Mad Turk made up the small blind, and I checked. This player Graham Lamb was a nemesis for all of the second day. He eventually knocked me out, and about half of my interesting pots on the Sunday directly involved him! Looking back, he really did own me alot of the time, passing to my value bets, and twice calling my bluffs. He did not seem a great player and seemed to play an exploitable style, but at the same time got alot of things right. He was limping too much into pots, with the predictbale range of hands (small pairs, suited rag aces, suited and non-suited connectors), but it was a move that gained him far more chips than it cost him. Here is how the pot played out:

(Flop 9d7c7d, pot 14,800)

I bet out 6k with air, as he was bad enough to pass if he was not interested in the flop. He made the call, the Turk passed, and I was ready to give up on the pot most of the time.

(Pot 26,800)

The turn came the 6 of diamonds (check-check), and the river the eight of diamonds for a board of 9d8d7c7c6d Yes, this gave me a straight flush! I bet out for 20,000, he had a long dwell, and passed.

What did I put him on? It was difficult to say. The one hand he could not have was three sevens (he definitely bets on the turn). He could, however, have-

97 or 76 for a flopped or turned house

86 for a flopped straight draw, now  a pair of eights

98 or 96 for a pair of nines

109 or J10 for a straight

An underpair to the flop, (55 for a straight)

This is actually a massively complicated spot, with so many hands in his range. To get the value bet right, I think I have to think, what is the chance he has a diamond? His turn check denies three sevens,and so he can only have a diamond if he has a pair of nines and his other card is a diamond, a diamond as part of an underpair, or as the jack in jack-ten. Basically, so many of his hands wrap around the flop that he is actually very unlikely to hold a diamond in his hand. Another big question is, will he re-raise with a house, and will he re-raise with the 5 of diamonds for the lower straight flush? I think he probably doesn;t re-raise any bet with a house, and raises 10k but not 20k with the five of diamonds.

Let’s have a look at what he will call with for the differing amounts:

10k- J10 or 109 for the straight, any diamond, 97 or 76(house), 86 (pair of eights), A9,K9,Q9,J9 (pair of nines), an underpair with a diamond.

20k- 97 or 76 (house), any pair of nines with a diamond (one quarter of A9, K9, Q9, J9), J10 and 109 half of the time,

40k- 97 or 76 (house), the five of diamonds, the Ad half of the time.

This hand is actually far more complicated than I had thought, but it would seem that 10k actually gets called more than twice as much as 20k does, and that this therefore might have been the right bet. Of course, it may just induce a bluff, or a value raise from a house or better. It didn’t seem it at the time, but I have found a mistake in value betting again here.

c) Second Day, Blinds 2000-4000 (400)

We were on the bubble, and I had been allowed to get away with daylight robbery, having raised the last four pots. I picked up 77, and made another gay raise to 9,000. Graham Lamb decided to stand up to me, but bizarrely by raising to just 16k. I of course could not pass, and elected to call.

(Pot 40,800, flop Q107 rainbow, giving me the bottom set. I had 140k behind)

It was a beautiful flop, and I knew I could get everything in against AA, KK and AQ. I led out for 12,000, and he made it 25k. To call would leave me 115k behind, and so I decided to slow play further. To be honest, I was very unsure what he had. It was very possible he had air, of course possible but not releveant that he could have a set, and possible he had a hand like JJor A10. What this small re-raise did was to make it less likely that he had ace-king or a pair lower than the ten. The turn came the worst possible card:

(Turn jack for QJ107 rainbow, pot 90,800, my stack 115k.)

The turn was the worst possible card, mainly because it would slow the action, but also because I had cause to worry slightly about JJ and AK, which had just outdrawn me. The all-important question to determine what I should do here was this- did I want to give myself any chance of possibly mucking the hand? If he bet 45k and then 70k, could I pass for the 70k on the end? I think I almost definitely could, unless the board paired. Checking would of course give a free card to a king or ace, and so I think I should have bet something like 35k, and be prepared to go bust.

I checked, the river came a blank five, and I value bet 35k into 90k. He dwelt up, signalling that he did have something, but made the pass.

It’s another difficult pot, but I think I made two mistakes. I think my lead out on the flop should be just a little bigger, but not too big to risk that he might pass. One of the most likely scenarios is that he is going to re-raise it as a bluff. Having made that mistake, I think I should have been willing to go broke on the turn, and made a bet to protect/get value from my hand.

D) Second Day, Blinds 2000-4000 (400)

Unbelievably, this was another pot against the same player, and the same situation with me in the big blind and the Mad Turk making up the small. I had Kd10d, and decided to check my option, leading to another pot of 14,800.

(Flop Qh10h7h, and the action is check round)

(Turn 6c, for a board of Qh10h7h6c, I bet 9k, and Lamb calls. Pot now 32,800)

(River 10d, for Qh10h10d7d6c, I have trip tens. I bet 20k, and he passes)

It is a spot where basically I wonder whether my value bet should be slightly smaller. He was quite clearly playing to the strength of his hand, and was probably more liekly to call 15k than a much bigger looking 20k.

Let’s have a look at his range after his turn call

97,87,96,86 (weighting 100%)- These hands, to give him a pair and gutshot, and possible flush draw, seemed the most likely.

J10,A10,109,108 (weighting 50%)- These hands are of course less likely as they include the case ten, and I have weighted smaller as he may well have bet the flop with them.

55,44,33,22 (weighting 60%)- These hands would have to include a heart.

Flopped flush (weighting 30%) I think he would have raised this hand by the turn.

A queen, or a flopped two pair or set, or a turned (weighting 20%) -He was too simple a player not to bet these hands on the flop, or raise on the turn.

It really felt at the time that I was aiming my value bet at the low pair hands (86,76,97 or 96), and my analysis bears this out. Although a 35k on the internet might prompt a hero call, this is definitely not right here. I really that think against this player, 15k is more likely to be called than 20k, and so that is what I should have bet.

14) Star City £500 tournament, 2nd November

Of all the mistakes in this column, this is the kind that I am gutted to report, and must try hardest to eliminate.

Blinds were 2000-4000(400), and I was in the BB with 9c8c. The button raised to 12k, and I made the call (pot is 29,200)

The flop came 864 rainbow, giving me the top pair. I checked, and the button bet 8k. It was a lady I had not seemed before, who seemed a good, but fairly standard player. This small bet fitted well with a set or aces, not at all with any other over pair, pretty well with ace-high, and too very well with 87,76,65 or 54, the pair+gutshot hands.

Basically, I had an easy re-raise, but failed to do so, and deserved the ace that came on the turn. She bet 15k, I passed and she showed an ace. The kind of poker from me not to be proud of.

15) £500 Star City tournament, 2 failed bluffs

The same player who three times passed to my value bets, caught me bluffing twice. Here are the pots;both times I have raised to 11k from EP, and he has called on the button,making a pot going to the flop of 30,800.

A) (I have 76o, flop AhQh9x, check-check.

(turn king of hearts, for AhQh9cKh, check-check)

(River Qd, for AhKhQhQd9c, I bet 15k, he looks unhappy but calls with A2).

I think it would be wrong to not bet here, as there are so many hands where he has to concede to my only chance of winning the pot. Maybe 12k is better than 15k, as it folds out the same hands? Maybe I should make a 10k turn bet, and 20K on the river. That folds out any king, and I think gives me a 70% of betting 30k to win 40k against his rag aces. And given his tendency to seem to like to call medium river bets but not big ones with marginal hands, maybe I should bet 30k on the end?

B) (I have 106, off, flop Ks5s4c, I bet 15k, he calls. Pot 60,800.)

(Turn 3s, for K543sss, check-check)

(River Qs, for KQ543ssss, I bet 18k, he quickly calls, and shows 75off, no spade).

This really was a horrible spot, to be caught by a hand I assumed he could not call with on this board, the 4th pair with no spade. I don’t want to take too much away from his call, as it was of course a great call, but I would say it was made to a large part out of frustration of the river bets that he had passed before.

I definitely think I should be bluffing the end here, as I have no other way to win and I suspect he is very weak,but I wonder if there are better ways to do it. I think the best way is to throw out a small 13k “license to bluff” bet on the turn, which will then set up a good spot to bet 22k on the river. This kind of bluffing really takes advantage of the fact that many live players are not aware of the size of the pot, and specifically often underestimate the size of the pot. This means that bets are far smaller relative to the pot than you see online, and you can get away with far smaller bluffs.

Given I do not bet the turn, I just wonder whether 25k is better than 18k on the end, as it may fold out all of his one pair hands.

I think the key learning point to this hand is the way the history will influence the other player. Twice he has folded to river bets before, and not known whether he was right. I think this means that I should not be firing a bad one-off bluff on the river, as it just gives too much cause for suspicion. Both times, even a very small bet on the turn might have helped my cause.

16) Star City £500 tournament, exit hand

I am still gutted about my exit hand. Not only was it once again at the hands of my nemesis Mr Lamb, but it was a hand I thought a long time about passing, and just had a bad feeling about. It’s difficult to say, therefore, why I did call, and I just really hope it was not to do with being owned a couple of times already in the day by this opponent, and not wanting to make a massive laydown against him. The hand was basically an overpair vs set situation, but here it is in full.

I am playing 165k UTG, with blinds of 2k-4k (400) early on the final table. The previous hand, I have raised to 11k, and laid down to Jon Kalmar’s re-raise. I now pick up KK, and Mr Lamb is on the big blind. I make the same raise to 11k, hoping to look weak. On reflection, this is the only certain mistake. The fact that I have got re-raised in the previous hand with the same opening bet actually does not make me look weaker this time- in fact, I see the best time to get a steal through as being the hand after you have re-raised. By raising to only 11k, I should have known that Mr Lamb would call from the big blind, and therefore that I was much more likely yo go to the flop 3-way rather than 2-way. Indeed, Mr Lamb did call, after a young Chinese player had called also on the button. To break the suspense, Mr Lamb held pocket fours.

(Pot 38,200, my stack 154k)

The flop came Js10s4d, giving me an overpair to the board. Lamb checked, I bet 22k and the Chinese kid passed. The action was back on Mr Lamb, who asked how much I had left. I counted and replied “132 thousand,” and he thought for a little longer before making it 75k to go.

This amount obviously implied that he was raising all my chips, but I was sure was stronger than a straight all-in. I now had the decision to either pass, or put in my remaining 132k, for a pot that would become 346,200. This gave me pot odds of 38%.  I’m going to look at the hand in the two opposing ways that poker offers; firstly, the whole psychology of the situation of the time, and then simply the number crunching. I’m going to use a very useful tool called Poker Stove to help me with that.

So, what could Mr Lamb hold for this move? And what about the context of what had gone before that afternoon, where he had obivously treated my every move with suspicion? Well, I think this history actually would have less effect than it might seem, as he was good enough to know that I would in turn give a check-raise from him less credit. In fact, I think he was good enough to know that I must be strong for raising UTG and then betting the flop, and knew that he himself may seem weak. On this basis, I knew that I actually had to give his move slightly more credit than it may seem. One thing that was for sure was that he was definitely not pulling an outright bluff.

The thing that of course concerned me was that the amount he raised was possibly the strongest possible amount to raise, and particularly so after he had asked how much I had left, and then made a re-raise of almost half of it. The precision of asking for the first time how much I had also was cause for concern, as it screamed to me ”value bet” much more than in did “bluff.” 

But what of the hands that he could value bet that I am beating? These are namely AJ, KJ and QJ? Well, the big thing was that it just did not feel that he would make this re-raise with those hands. He may well have bet them out, and I just really felt that with AJ his check-raise would have been all in. Thinking back, he had been in this exact spot once before, and this time he led out from the BB with the second pair. It all made it feel that his check-raise was very specifically strong.

The problem was that of course there were not many hands that had me beat. He would surely have re-raised JJ or TT before the flop, and so I was left really just to worry about jack-ten or 44. Jack-ten seemed to fit perfectly, and 44 almost so.

A big part of his range would normally be made up by big draws- here AsQs, KsQs, 9s8s, Qs9s, Ks9s were all big contenders, as to a slightly lesser extent, Asxs and KQ or 89 for  a straight draw. Once again, I really felt that he would not be clever enough to make the strong looking move with these hands of re-raising half my stack, rather than going all-in.

And what of a hand like Ace-ten or QJ, where he just didn’t believe me? It might seem it, but I just really think it wouldn’t have happened in this spot. The pot was just too big- if he didn’t believe me, he would have flat called.

All of the things I have discussed just contributed to a “feel” that he was big here. It just really did not feel like an ace-jack kind of spot. I’m going to use all of this analysis to do the number crunching, and see whether that can bring me to an exact conclusion. Poker Stove is not something to rely too heavily on, but can be a useful tool to work out your equity against a range of hands. IHere are the equities against certain hands, and then the weighting I have them, and the number of combinations of those hands.

J10 (weighting 9, combos 9=81) Equity= 30%

44 (weighting 8, combos 3=24) Equity= 13.7%

AJ(weighting 3, combos 12=36) Equity=79%

KJ, QJ (weighting 2, combos 12=24) Equity=87%

A10(weighting 1, combos 12=12) Equity-79%

KQ(weighting 2, combos 8=16) Equity=66%

98(weighting 1, combos 16=16) Equity=67%

AsQs(weighting 3, combos 1=3) Equity= 51%

KsQs,9s8s (weighting 4, combos 2=8) Equity=45%

Qs9s,Ks9s(weighting 2, combos 2=4)Equity=53%

As4s(weighting, combos 1=4) Equity=50%

A bit of number crunching tells me that my equity against this range is 49.1%, compared to pot odds of 38%. Well, that tells me to call l I guess, but that is why this number crunching is of limited use. I don’t want to be giving my opponent a range, I want to be giving him a hand. Something just felt really bad in this spot- in fact it really felt like a jack-ten which turned out to be wrong, but I should have followed that feeling and pitched the hand.

17) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

My starting table was fairly typical for one of these GUKPT events- pretty tight, and pretty bad. One of the players who epitomised this limped the CO for 200, and Pete Singleton made up the small blind. I had Jh4h in the big blind, and raised it up 600 more. I think like 75% of the time the action is going to go-call from the CO player, pass from Pete, we both flop nothing, and a half-pot C-bet wins it.

The issue was complicated slightly by the fact I actually flopped something! The flop came J85ss, and I was looking at a pot of 1,800, a an effective stack of 5,500 (3 times the pot).

The action went 1,200 from me, call. (Pot 4,200, effective stack 4,300)

Turn 2d, a brick.  I bet 3,000, the cut-off goes all-in for the remaining 1,300, I call, and she tables QJ to send my 20k reeling down to 13.5k.

So, can I give myself the option of not getting all the chips in on this problematic flop? The stack size actually could not be any more awkward, just possibly meaning I shouldn’t pull what looked like an obivous play before the flop?

So, let’s go back to the flop, J85ss, where the pot is 1,800 and the ES 4,300. Can I bet 900  (pot 3,600, ES 3,400), and then check-fold a blank turn. Possibly.

Or bet 900, bet 1,200, and pass for the remaining 1,800. Unlikely.

Or check, call a bet on the flop, and probably check down turn and river? This might be best, but gives free cards to the straight and flush draws.

OR bet 600 (Pot 3,000, ES 3,700) and check-pass the turn|?

I think probably not. I think I can be cautious on the J52 rainbow, but on this flop and blank turn maybe have to stack off.

18) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

The only player at the table who had anything that could be described as a poker game was Rob Cowan, two to my right. Being the other young agressive player at the table, it was inevitable we would clash, and I think I should have thought about this more strongly before making the pass that I did. I had already tried to rile him gently with some banter, so I think I should have been ready for him to try to bluff me.

Rob raised to 125 on the hijack. In actually read alot into the 125, as I thought it was much more likely to be a limping hand where he wanted to control the pot, rather than an Aq or 99 type hand. For this reason, I decided to re-raise in position, with a decent read on his hand range. I had Q5o, made it 350 to go, and he called. The action went:

(Pot 775, flop 652dd, giving me middle pair) Bet 600-call

(Pot 1925, turn 6652dd, pairing the board) Bet 300 from Rob, call from me.

(Pot 2525, river 76522) Bet 1,500 from Rob, eventual pass from me. He later told me he had q8 of diamonds, which I 100% believe.

I think the psychology of the situation should tell me to call, including the big clue sent out by the comically small turn bet when the six paired. This polarised his range to one of two things- either inducing action with a six, or a combo of a free-card and setting up a river bet with a call. I did know not which it was, but I think there was enough reason to be suspicious about the second possiblity.

The seven is obviously a bad card, as now all the flop straight draws beat me, but it becomes far less bad when he makes a big bet. Now I can take 87 and 97 out of his range. I think I should have concentrated more on my read that his hand was either suited or connected,and realised that there were too many hands I could beat. Here is how I analysed his hand range.

Overpair to the board- very unlikely, out ofthe window after his turn bet.

A six- Vey possible, would probably now be a house with 76 or 65. However, there were only a few possiblities for sixes, namely 76,65,86 and A6 suited.

Busted diamonds- fits perfectly, but obv. I cannot beat a seven of diamonds or the 89 of diamonds (straight). However, these hands might have given more action on the flop.

87 or 97- I think made far less likely by the strong river bet. I think if he checks the river,  I have to realise he probably has a seven, and bet big.

I think there are too many hands I can beat, and I should call. There was also a big physcial tell that I should picked up on. Rob had made the nut flush on the very first hand of the hand, and did a “fake shake” a little to try to get Pete Signleton to call. He did not do that this time, and I should have picked up on this. All in all, the clues were all there, and so I need to ask myself  why I didn’t have the instinct to make the call. Somehow, I am not getting myself into the mindset to make these big decisions, but then am able to see it all afterwards. It was a pot that would have had me as low as 4,500 if I was wrong, but I should be far less self conscious about the chip positions, and be in a better position to go with my instinct.

19) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

The other interesting character at the table was the only unpleasant one. It was an old guy who seemed to take exception to my aggression. Not only did this mean he was less likely to believe me, but he was also more likely to take me on in a pot.

He limped the hijack, the SB made it up for 200, and I made it 600 more with AhJh. He called, and I put him on a wide range of marginal hands.

The flop came out A62 rainbow. I checked, and he bet 1,200 into 1,800. He looked nervous about this, and at this point I should have been absolutely  clear that he was bluffing with air. The turn and river both came fives. We checked the turn, and the action was to me on the river, as I felt that he was ready to bluff. I think the best way to make him do that would have been to make a comically small bet, rather than to check. There is definitely a case for making this small bet on the turn, before checking the river. This works particualrly well if he  misses a draw on the turn, but may lose me good value if he has true air.

It’s yet another case for me of feeling slightly jumbled during a live hand. I need sometimes to make my mind up on a read, and go very strongly with that read. I also remember feeling worried that he may have hit running fives. This is just ridiculous, I need to stop worrying about unlikely hands so much.

20) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

Missed value bet

My opponent was clearly a weak player with a big stack- loose, cally, but also passive. I had KJo, and made up the 1,000 small blind with 29,000 behind. He checked the big, and the flop came out J109 rainbow. I bet 1,100 into 2,575, and he re-rasied to 2,600. There is no choice but to call here. (Pot 7,575) The turn and river came to blank the board J10953.

He bet an unsure looking 2,600 on the turn (Pot 7,575, my stack 26,400), and I flat called. This made a pot on 12,775 on the river, which we both checked. I missed a clear value bet here. The obvious logic is that I would have to call up to a 4k bet from such a clueless player, but that he is going to check behind alot of hands like the K9 he had that I am beating. The big clue for me is his fishy “repeat bet” on the turn, which usually means a weak one a pair from these bad players. I think I can also pick up from this kind of action that he has a straight draw (good news, as I beat every pair and straight draw hand). So, I think I should value bet 3k on the end, but maybe even 10k? This depends on how much of a calling station he is, but I should really use a great turn and river to my advantage. It’s difficult to get into a bad player’s mentality, but I think he may put me on a busted straight draw, but also will be defeated by his own confusion.

Is there even a case for value raising the turn? I do have the 2nd nut one pair hand, and good outs against 109. The big problem is that I might deny myself a great river card against a hand like 109or the bottom straight, and could lose value. I think this would be an overly risky move, but may be the right one.

21) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

A bad player limped in mid-position with a wide range of marginal hands, and I made it up in the SB with K5 (no diamond), and the 150/300 (25) blinds. There was 1,125 in the pot, going to the A93ddd flop. It was checked round, and it just felt like the CO player did not have much interest in the pot- i.e. no ace,  no nine, no high diamond, and no flush.

The turn came the best card to bluff- an offsuit nine. I decided to put the mid position player on a small pocket pair, and bet out 600. He made a weak looking call, and we saw a blank seven on the river. The pot was 2,325, and I bet 500. He raised to 2,500, and showed 77 for a rivered house. I said something like “pwpelsff,” frustrated that the obvious read was right. I think my bet is awful though- I should bet slightly more, to make sure that he will be folding, if hehas 66 or 55, instead of his 77.

22) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 14th November

Possible missed value.

Rob Cowan limped UTG for 400, and I made it 1,300 UTG+2 with AK off. Angry old guy called from the small blind, and Rob actually passed. The flop came out AxQx3c (Pot 3,600, my stack 13,300), and the old guy bet out 1,625. This was good news really; it felt like (very likely AJ/likely flush draw/ possible AK, unlikely but possible AQ). I decided to flat call, to use position, and under-rep my hand. The turn came a king, a great card. (turn AKQ3cc, pot 6,850, my stack 11,675), and I had to  decide how best to get all the money it. I bet 3,000 into the 6,850 pot, and he called. (Pot 11,850, my stack 8,675). The river came the absolute gin card, the king of clubs, to give me the 2nd nut house. I looked down at my stack, and bet 6,700. He made  a frustrated call, and showed AJ, making me wonder whether I really should have got the last 1,975 in as well. I think my turn bet can be slightly bigger, as he is just not passing AJ,KQ or s flush draw, and in fact should be 4k.

Of course, his call on the end is an awful one, but he does not know this. I think it’s a spot where I’m losing for every chip I don’t get into the pot against this poor player.

23) Blackpool GUKPT Day 2, Sunday 15th November

For all the awful play against me on Friday, the donkeys were completlely overshadowed early on Saturday. Unfortunately, they were overshadowed by me, in one of the worst plays I have ever made. This is definitely the worst of the 23 mistakes so far, and hopefully will remain the worst for a while! Here’s the pot:

I raised to 3,300 on the CO with 55, with a stack of 58k. The big blind is an unknown player, but seems fairly clueless, a bit spewy, but at least seems fairly loose and passive like the rest of them. He re-raises to 8,700, and I mistakenly put him on a decent hand. I called, leaving him a stack of 29,500 with a pot of 18,500 going to the flop. The flop came Jc8c7x, and we both checked. The turn came the miracle 5 of diamonds, and I checked behind his check, now putting him 90% on AK or AQ. The river came the three of diamonds, putting a possible backdoor flush out there, on a board of J8753ddd. He checked, I value bet 11,000, and only then did the craziness start.

He started to riffle with his chips, doing this incredibly annoying thing of riffling them in a way that advertised his cluelessness. Rather quickly for him, he put the rest of his chips in, and I hated life. It would be 18,500 more to me, making a pot of 67,500 (pot odds 3.75 to 1).

What was immiediately fairly clear was that I could probably only beat a bluff. The exception to this 33, or just possible AA played like a complete muppet. I had to have a good think through a number of unlikely possiblites, and this is how they looked in my racing mind:

Rivered flush- he would not have bet his turned flush draw? And to make what was probably the nut flush, and play for a check raise? It was possible, but most people wouldn’t do it.

Flopped set or straight- It would seem very unlikely to not value bet this on the turn, and even more so on the river.

AA or two pair- I would just really hope not, but I guess it had to be possible.

A river bluff- Of course, this was the one big possiblity for a hand I could beat, but could it really be true? For an amateur to make a check-raise all-in stone cold bluff on the river. Why not bet out the river if he thought I had nothing. Of course, it’s dangerous to credit these players with any logic, but this would seem an unusual thing to do. But what would he do with a hand like AQ or A9, if he panicked. Something about his overemotional personatlity maybe should have told me it was possible.

The problem could of course be that my 11k value bet is very big, and makes it look like I have nothing. Could he then have suddenly decided to do something that he had never logically planned to do, and thought the only chance he had of winning the pot was to go all-in.

Of course, I passed, and he showed ace-nine high. It was an awful, awful moment, and left me feeling sick.

Incidentally, I think there are another couple of mistakes in the hand, that I should note. Theyare not directly relevant to the eventual outcome, though of course would have changed it. Firstly, I should put him on AK on the flop, and make a half-pot stab. I am really disappointed to realise that I think I froze a little, and preferred to check it down. I think I should also make a small value bet on the turn- it does not affect too much the fact that he won’t give me any credit on the river. As it turned out, of course I gave him free cards on both streets (double belly duster on the turn).

For all the logic of the hand, the problem also could just come down to body language. It really shouldn’t be possible for someone to make such a massive bluff, and for me not to pick it off. I think I need to assure myself a bit more at the table by making the following adjustments:

• I have to take more time over my crucial decisions, and allow myself to consider the hand from all the angles that I do in this column.
• I have to make sure I’m watching my opponent at all the crucial times. My analysis is always split almost direclty in two. First of all, I should do all my analysis, as I would in the online game.Having got everything I can from that (here, it would simply be “I can only beat a bluff,”) I should then put all my thought into working out just from psychology and body language, whether he is bluffing.
• The other problem in the hand is my freeze up on the flop. I really have to keep my composure much better in the big hands, and this is something I still need to work on.

 24) Blackpool GUKPT Day 1, Friday 21st November, £1000 Main Event

Missed value in a good spot.

I think I just about minimised my value in what was a good spot for me. The old guy raised the 150/300 blinds to 900 in late position, and I called with AKo in the big blind. (Pot 1,900, and the effective stack was 15k). The size of his raise combined with something in his demeanour, a mix of genuinenss and aggression, just said “medium pocket pair.” It seemed liekly he had 88 or 99, and I think this was a good spot to change a vague read into a definite one. There will always be a choice of fairly close ways to play if I do hit an ace or a king, and so I think this is a spot where I should have decided to play the hand, as if  he definitely had this hand.

The board came out K73104, and I checked each street, calling a 1,225 bet on the turn. I think my strategy on the king high flop should be to get two big bets in the middle. I think I should lead the flop fairly big, and then probably check the turn, and bet the end. There is a case for bet-bet-bet, which  I think is a good one if I bet small on the turn. Given that I check-called the turn, I should clearly lead out the end, and I think this is a real bad case of missed value.

The real disappointment here is that I am sometimes over conscious of hands that can beat me in these tournaments. With an effective stack of 8BBs, I think I need to be more realistic, and be prepared to get it all in on a king high flop.

And an ace high flop? This is trickier, as I should aim to get less value. Bet-check-bet may still work, but I think check-call-bet probably works best.

25) Amsterdam 1000 Event, Friday 16th November, First Day

Blinds of 25/50, and Jan Boubli makes it 150 in 3rd position after one limper. Two players called in between, and I looked down at AhJh. Given the cally nature of the game and I read I had on Boubli, it should have been absolutely obvious that a) Boubli had a speculative hand that wanted to see the flop and b) the other players had non-threatening hands. I think my hand really should be a squeeze here, but I opted to call and see a flop.

(Pot 800, flop A55 rainbow)

Boubli bet out 450, called by the talented Dan Ruiter in between. I think a call is obvious here, but I should have chosen differently when both players checked to me on the A552 turn. Now it was clear Ruiter did not have a five, so I almost definitely had him out-kicked.I should have bet to get value/protect my hand, and ultimately to stop happening what transpired- Boubli made  a wierd but ultimatley successful bluff with Jd7d on a blank river.

26) Amsterdam 6000 Euro Main Event, Tuesday 20th November

Two failed check-raises.

Twice I tried the cash game play of check-raising a dry flop after calling and missing from the BB,and twice I failed.

Firstly, with Ks10s, I checked a flop of A72hh to the CO raiser. He bet a small 150 into 375, and I check-raised to 400. He then re-re-raised to 1,100 which I suspect may not have been a genuine hand. The reason I made the play was that I thought his 150 bet might be weak, but really I think the best size may have been 200.I think from such a strong young player, this bet is either really strong or setting up a 3-bet spot to represent strength. I would actually guess he may have had the nut flush draw, but either way, I think I chose a non-optimum spot to bluff.

Secondly, I called a raise from the button to 300 with 7c5c, and checked a K33 flop. My button opponent bet 500, andI think this is actually a bit too big to try what I did- a re-raise to 1,300. He called, and bet the river after checking a blank turn. I think the idea is right, but in both spots, I may have just been a little too enthusiastic to pull a move.

27) GUKPT London Main Event, Final table, Sunday 30th November, Final hand

(Blinds 8k/16k (1000), five-handed, round is 29k. My stack 500k)

There is going to be alot from London, and I’ll start with the toughest and the last. This is definitely the hand that will live longest in the memory, and is very possibly the worst mistake.

I looked down at KQo in the small-blind, as Norweigan Svanes raised the button to 40k. I made the call (93k pot), and we saw a K54 rainbow flop. I checked, the Norweigan bet 65k (Pot 193k if I call), and I moved all-in, for 385k more. He snaps, tables AK, and a miracle can’t save me from a sudden knock-out, after being the chip leader twenty minutes before.

The first thing to say is that this is an big over-push- 395k into a called pot of 193k doesn;t sound too bad, but putting in 450k to win 158k surely is. There is just no point to the push- it will get thin value out of a tight range that includes little more than KJ and possibly K10, and of course denies me the value of him firing off another barrel if he is bluffing. The king high rainbow board is the perfect one to play pasively on, and it is worth taking the tiny risk that he will have a hand like AQ and hit his ace. The reason the push is so horrible is that my hand really isn’t functioning at all- I almost might as well have 65 and more outs.

For all that I have done, there are still ways in which I haven’t made the adaption from online to live poker. I thought “what if he fires three barrels with the straight draw?” but this just does not happen. The pot should probably go- call from me, (pot now 193k, I’m playing 395k), the turn comes a four, he will bet 110k, I will call, leaving 285k and a pot of 413k, and I think I can confidently pass the end. As it happens, it came a jack, and this would be an easy pass, but I would be also on K5448,K5443,K5447, or even K5544.

There are two big regrets I have about the pot, and one is this. As we went into the pot, I had just been on a spiral down from the chip lead, having lost a big pot against Duvall AIPF AQ vs KJ, and the full house against Pab (next hand to be described on here). I wasn’t fully aware how many chips I had, as I hadn’t had time to count, but something I have got to get used to doing is this- just put a chip on my cards, and allow myself time to think.

The other major aspect of the hand is that I was beginning to get a good physical read on the Norweigan. On this hand, two things happened which should have been a big clue. He stopped for longer than usual to think before he made his flop bet- it was a pause long enough that I should have known it wasn’t a normal continuation bet. More crucially, the 65k went into the pot with a shaky hand; this really should have been a warning that he might have a massive hand. It makes me realise that, even though I am beginning to pick up tells a little, I still have a long way to go before I can capatalise on my instinct, and make good reads on them.

I’m sad to say it, but I lost my composure on this hand. I should have realised that my mind wasn’t as cool as it usually is, having swung down in the previous few minutes from a chip leading 838k to 500k, and all I needed to do was to say to myself “stop and think.”

 Another really disappointing aspect of this hand was how it contrasts to the hand before, where I feared I had played too passively against Pab. It’s horrible to say that I may have let this worry play on my mind a little, and let myself make a mistake in the other direction. It really does show that I still have to work at my composure at the table, and it maybe still hasn’t reached the heights that I think it has.

28) GUKPT Grand Final, final table,Sunday 30th November, the Pab hand

Coming back after the break as the five-handed chip leader, I played out a pot with Pab, who was sat to my immediate right. He began the hand with 480k by making a raise to 40k, and I flatted the button with jacks. He bet every street of a 844K3 board, and I called two streets before passing the river. The relevant pot sizes and bets were

Flop-(Pot 109k, effective stack 440k, he bets 55k , call)

Turn-(Pot 219k, effective stack 385k, he bets 90k, call)

River-(Pot 399k, effective stack 295k, he moves all-in, pass)

The pass on the end is easy given the spot. I was not absolutely sure, but I felt that Pab was not going to triple barrel complete air. He confirmed this exact sentiment after, and also was really kind to tell me that he had pocket threes, and had taken the lead on the river with a full house. So, on the river I found the best option, and on each previous street, the second best. Can I find the best (a raise) at any point?

Pre flop- (Pab’s 40k raise puts 69k in the pot, and his stack is 440k). The biggest problem that I need to conisder with my game is that I am too passive in these spots, and do not like to three bet the kind of hand like jacks. If I do, it is to 130k, and it gives him the perfect stack size to 4-bet all-in. This decision would be a horrible one,as his range would be something like (JJ,QQ,KK,AA, 75% 1010, 50% 99, 60% AQ, 30%AJ, 30%88), and it think the equity of a call would be almost exactly neutral. At the same time, I think I worried too much about this posssiblity. Although Pab is a wonderful and aggressive player, I think I worry too much, and need to be far more realistic about the limits of sickness in ‘live’ poker. He had also passed quite quickly to previous three bets. However, I do not hate this decision, as I have certain advantages of playing a flop in position.

On the flop- The big problem with a re-raise on the flop is that it looks like a move- or even worse like an “information” re-raise with a hand like 66. If I re-raise to 135k, his stack after a call would be 305k,  giving him the good move for an all-in. It is definitely fair to say that a re-raise from me here could only be with the intention of getting all the chips in (otherwise my hand is playing no function as jacks). If I let him see two cards with an underpair, I gain a bit of value and run the risk of a 8% outdraw, and two overcards a 24% outdraw.

So, the question is, do I want to commit my stack and play for value with jacks here? His 55k bet puts 164k in the pot, and he is playing 385k behind. There is almost zero danger in being bluffed off the best hand, as I am calling on any turn, and passing to any three-barrel. I gain 90k of value if I flat-call and my hand holds up, but against his range of hands I beat, I am probably handing him a 14% outdraw chance. If I (effectively) move in for his last 385k, I imagine his range for getting it in is (AA,KK,QQ,1010, an eight, sometimes AK, sometimes 99, sometimes a random bluff). This is not a spot I like, but I think I really need to be prepared to get it in more marginally than I often do.

On the turn- AFter his 90k bet, there is 309k in the pot, and 295k in his stack. I could make it 200k and pass for the rest, but the only point of this is to relive myself of the 4% outdraw chance of an underpair, or at most the 16% of AQ. There is no bluffing value in re-raising here, and very little danger I will be bluffed off on the end.

All in all, I am quite happy to see that I didn’t play the hand too badly. I think I should definitely have been raising Pab a little more in position though (though maybe JJ is not the hand to do it with), and that I definitely worry too much about these spots.

29) GUKPT Grand Final, final table, Sunday 30th November, the hand immediately after

A little shaken from this hand, I raised the Norweigan’s blind on the very next hand to 42k with 9h8h. His call gave us a pot of 89k going to the flop. The flop came QQ10, and I echoed his check to see a QQ107 turn. He bet 55k, and I passed my straight draw.

This one is quite simple. He might decide to come after me on the flop, but there is too much equity to not c-bet that flop. He might well believe I would bet three queens here, and I gave him way too much credit in worrying that he might sniff a re-raise here. It’s a real example of how my online play is different (where I prefer to play air on this flop for a delayed c-bet), and unfortunately it affected me here.

I think I needed to be realistic and ask myself “am I’m going to re-raise the turn if he bets?” Knowing that the answer was no, I should have made the easier play of betting the flop.

And should I re-raise the turn? I think he will put down (an airball, a seven, maybe a ten, a weak draw), and so I probably should do. It’s a play that looks much stronger in live poker than the suspicious online environment, and so I think it was a mistake not to. Bad missed opportunity here. In fact, I think it is a better play than betting the flop, as there is no chance that he can bluff me off the hand.

29B) GUKPT Grand Final, Final table in general

I’m pretty pleased with the way I played the final table, and I was pretty aggressive all the time. However, I am very aware that I have alot of gears, but maybe not the 6th one. I just wonder whether at the final table (and towards the end of day two), the situation was calling for a super-aggressive game. I think I sitll need sometimes to be able to run over the table, and I am one step short of doing this at the moment.

30) GUKPT Grand Final, Day 2, Saturday 29th November

In the big blind of 6,000 with 125k and the jack-ten of diamonds, Eric Svanes raised from the small blind to 18k. I called, and we saw a rainbow of AK10. He bet 24.4k, and I called (standard). I hit a ten on the turn, an absolute gin card, and it went check-check, and a seven came on the end, completing a very unlikely runner-runner flush draw. Svanes bet 44k, and I made the instant call. Stack sizes were:

(On the flop, I have 107k, pot 41k)

(After the flop, I have 82.5k, pot 89.8k)

When he bets44k, I have 38.5k behind. This mistake is actually worse than I realised- this is just a standard shove. Turn check has to be right, as there is a good chance he will bluff alot of rivers. The only reason it is right, however, is if I can be sure I will get it in against an ace on a blank river anyway.

31) GUKPT Grand Final, Aces and 3-betting

I picked up aces a lucky five times during the course of the final, and in certain spots feel that I did not get proper value from them. There were amazingly three spots in which I was 3-bet by aggressive players. Each time I 4-bet, and wondered each time whether I had lost my balls to find the correct slow-play.

1) (My stack 78k, blind 1k-2k. I am the cutoff, Pab is the small blind). I make it 6k, Pab makes it 18k, and I will have 60k behind in a 39k pot if I make the call. Instead, I move all-in, and Pab passes KQ of spades. This is the most clear mistake of the three. In position, this is the most obivous spot to find some balls, and just press the call button.

2) (My stack 160k, blinds 2.5k-5k, I am the hijack, Pab is the button). I make it 15k, Pab makes it 42k, and I move in for 118k more. It gives him a call of 118k to win 328k (about 36% pot odds) He passes pocket sevens. If I flat-call, I will be playing 118k out position in a 91k pot. This is bizarrely almost exactly the same spot as the first, and I think my move in is probably right out of position, and given that he has passed to the 4-bet before.

3) (Final table, blinds 5k-10k, I’m playing 490k, and make it 30k from the button, Svanes makes it 90k from the small blind).

This is the only spot where I have a chance to 4-bet to 200k, and hope that he pushes for the rest. However, it felt better to move all-in, as it looks weaker. A flat-call here would give me position, and a stack of 400k in a 198k pot. This is a little bigger than I would have liked (perfect spot is about 1.3 times the pot), and so I think this was the right option.

The spot against Pab is the one I will always remember as losing my balls, I think the other two are probably right.

 32) GUKPT Grand Final, Day 2, Saturday 29th November

In a hand against Robin Keston, I limped the SB with A5 off, and we checked a K74dd flop. I bet 9k (2/3 pot) on a K754ddd turn, and checked the K7754ddd end, to catch a bluff. He checked, and showed 42, with the two of diamonds. I think I shouldn’t check to catch a bluff in a blind on blind situation, as it is unlikely he has the ace of diamonds. It would be clearer on a board without a straight draw, but I feel there is a good value bet against a four, but also a five, which I have outkicked. A good value bet could be as big as 70% of the pot, and the reason why this hand seems tempting as a bluff catcher rather than value bettor is that I can make a value bet bigger than he would make a bluff.

The range to call is any four and any other five,whilst his range to value bet includes a six with any diamond, an ace or king of diamonds, any possibly an eight with a diamond. I think this hand is probably just about a check (why hasn’t he bet a four on the flop?), but that my check would be a clear mistake if the board was K9954ddd, rather than K7754ddd.

33) GUKPT Grand Final, Day 1, Thursday 27th November

I had been at a ridiculously good and aggressive table all day, a pattern which continued with the arrival of Karl Mahrenlohz to my right.

He raised to 1,100 (blinds of 200/400) on the CO, and I made it 3,300 with an effective stack of 19k on the button, with Ks2s. He thought for a while, and put in enough chips to put me all-in. (And I decide to make the pass!)

This was a retarded move in two ways. Firstly, it was completely the wrong type of opponent, as I had not 3-bet with air all day. Being the only one to just arrive at the table, he of course was the only one to not know this.

I also made the mistake of assuming that Karl was a very good aggressive player, but would not 4-bet bluff. This is not true- he is actually a sicker puppy than I thought.

34) GUKPT Grand Final, Day 2, Saturday 29th November

Start of the second day now, and I’ve come back with 48k. Blinds are 600/1200 (100), and Cascarino raises UTG to 3,400. William Martin calls UTG+2, and I call from the BB with QcJc. My first mistake is that I should be far more aware of Martin’s range than I was- it is polarised heavily by (77,88,99,10,10,AQ,AJ)

Flop comes Kc5c4c (Pot 11k, my stack 44.6k), giving me the 2nd nut flush, and it’s checked round.

Turn Kc5c4c8c, counterfeiting my hand. Checked round.

River Kc5c4c8c4d. Checked round.

I made two mistakes in the hand. Firstly, this is clear lead on the flop, becuase it is king high rather than eight high.

SEcondly, I think I should value bet rather than bluff catch the end. Martin has loads of hands that can beat a bluff, but few hands without showdown value that need to bluff. Also, if he needed to bluff, he may have started it on the turn.

35) Prague EPT, Wednesday 9th December, Day 1a

Couple of two pair hands:

A couple of slightly wierd two pair hands, that I maybe played too passively.Let’s have a look:

1) I raise 7h5h EP to 375 (blinds 75/150). One strong, young Finnish guy calls on the hijack. The board comes 852 rainbow, so I flop the middle pair. A bet is difficult here, so I check, which he echoes.

The turn and river come 852710, and I check to him twice, and insta-call bets of 500 and 1,000. I probably got this one right, as I feel he was bluffing, but it felt like an over passive way to play the hand.

2) Blinds 150/300 (25). I raise Js10s EP to 750, the big blind Brolin calls, and slightly fishy French guy calls. The board comes KdJh8d, and we all check. The French guy checks in a way that makes me feel he has nothing at all. Turn comes KJ86hhdd, I bet  2,200 and the French guy calls. It looks like he could have a diamond draw, though possibly an eight or a six. A jack or a king seems unlikely. The river comes KJ1086hhhdd, giving me two pair and completing the flop flush draw. ACtion goes check-check.

I think a small bet to induce a raise might be the best plan.He obivously does not have the heart flush, and is probably playing a one pair hand like 87,76 or 77. The only way of getting value out of these hands is inviting him to turn them into a bluff.

36)Prague EPT, Wednesday 9th December, Day 1a

I raised Ac8c mid position to 900, with blinds of 150/300(25), on Levi’s big blind. He re-raises 2,600 more, leaving himself 11,000 behind, and I think I should push. There is a wide range with which he does this, and I felt this was probably coming.

37) Prague EPT, Wednesday 9th December, Day 1a

Couple of failed bluffs:

1)Will Fry came to the table, and seemed to be playing like an absolute nutter (although he told me on this hand that he had J10)

He raised CO to 525 (100/200), and I defended Q9. Board came Kj3J: flop was check-check, and turn I bet 550, and he raised 1,200 more. Problem is, his check on the flop tightens his range to (hands with a jack, underpairs to the jack), but is weighted quite heavily to jacks. I think probably the best thing to do in this hand is to re-raise before the flop.

2) Blinds 200/400(25), now we have a bad player at the table, a loose-passive local. He raises to 1,500, and I can’t wait to call the BB with 7s6s. Board comes K52h3h5h; action is check-check; I bet 1,700-quick call;I bet 3,000-he raises something, I pass.

The way he called on the turn held up a sign saying he had a draw, which I took to be a gutshot. I think I should have  studied him more carefully, read him for the heart draw, and maybe decided the river was the wrong card to bluff.

38) Prague EPT, Wednesday 9th December, Day 1a

Butchered AK pre-flop

Blinds are 200/400(25), and the effective stacks are

Russian guy 17k- this is the guy called the cockroach, he seems to be playing an over-aggressive tilt.

Me 28k

New fishy player- 15k

Russian guy opens 1,200 EP, I flat with AK, new fishy player makes it 5k more, in a quick and weak way. Russian guy fairly quickly calls, I pass.

The problem is that I have no fold equity, and would need to play 3-way for their 17k and 15k stacks. My assessment of their hands was wrong, as their actions should have signalled to me that they were towards the weak end of their ranges. The fishy guy seemed to have either AK or 1010, but the Russian guy could have been as weak as AQ, or even A10s. I think I should either have 3-bet the Russian pre-flop, and been prepared to play for stacks, or have been prepared to gamble against both of them.

39) Prague EPT, Wednesday 9th December, Day 1a

Value betting aces

I have aces,and raise Brolin’s big blind to 375 (pot 800). The board comes 109610K, and he telegraphs that he has hit the flop marginally, has something on the turn, and that the river has done something interesting.

I check, bet 550, and bet 1,200, and he calls and shows K9. I think my two value bets should probably be a little bigger, but that I should maybe bet the flop. I could possibly bet 550-600-1,400 under the same action, or even 550-1200-2000. I think I am too passive with aces against bad players here, and should maybe aim to get three streets of value.

40) Prague EPT side events, 12th-14th December 2008

The side events in Prague turned out to be a real disappointment, both in terms of my play and luck, but mainly because of the shockingly bad structures. However, they still threw up a few mistakes, so here we go:

A) A talented young Dutch guy raised to 525 from the KO, and I defended my big blind with 66. The board came out Q1035Q, and had been checked down to the river. I now believed my sixes were good. I decided to throw out a comically small 125, partly for thin value, but mainly to induce a bluff. The Dutch guy raised to 775, and I had to call. He showed K10, for what is a super read of the situation and great value bet.

The idea is a decent one against a talented player, but this was completely the wrong spot. It’s the right idea where there has been previous betting, and I can rightly represent worries about my hand. Here, the checks from a good player show that he definitely has show down value, and so I should be worried when he does decide to bluff. I think I should have passed, as I don’t necessarily have to follow my plan through just because I started it.

B) A poor player on the button raised by blind to 550, and I defended 85 of clubs. The flop came out 1076 for an open-ender, and I check-called 900. I knew I could bluff the end small if it blanked out, and knew a check-raise would be replied to with an all-in from an overpair. The board rolled out 1076s3s9s, giving me the straight on the end. The guy’s check on a blank turn was a quick one, and I thought suggested that he did not have a great hand to value bet.I therefore decided to play to catch a bluff on the end, but was foiled by a check behind. What I’m not sure about is this- is a weak player more or less likely to construct a bluff on this connected end? They are definitely more likely than a strong player I think, but I’m not sure what the right plan is here.

C) This mistake is just awful, and I really hope is a kind I will not have to report in 2009. I limped As5s for 50, and the small blind made it 225 to go. I called after the big blind, and we all checked a flop of Q103. The turn came a second queen and a second spade, and the big blind player bet 400 into the 675 pot. I had a stack of 3.5k, and decided to raise to 1,200, with no certain plan for the end. The BB player moved all-in, I had to pass, and he showed king-queen. My stack in this spot meant that this really was an awful re-raise.

D) A poor looking player raised to 125 in MP and I called the button with sixes. The BB called, and the flop rolled out a beautiful KhQd6h, giving me the bottom set. The raiser bet 175, and called my re-raise to 475.The board came out KQ6hhd3d9d, completing a OESD on the flop and backdoor flush draws. I had value bets paid off of 1,100 and 2,200 after a minute’s dwell up.

The value bet on the end I think is right, and I would say I found the borderline of his calling range as he agonised over a call. I just wonder in this spot whether I should be trying to find bigger value bets on the flop and turn. Are there any hands he calls for 475, but passes for 675? Possibly not. Althought it sometimes feels a disaster to have your opponent pass on the flop, as it denies you two more streets of value, equally a big value bet on the flop really inflates a pot for later on (equivalent betting could be 675, 1,500, 3,000, for a total of 5175 rather than 3775.)

E) Another value spot: With blind of 150/300, I checked behind A6 after the small blind completed. The board came out a rainbow A8456, and the action was

Flop- he bet 400, I call (pot 1.4k)

Turn- He check-called 1k(pot 3.4k)

River- He tank-passed 2k of his remaining 4k stack

I think I should maybe re-raise the flop here; I am unlikely to catch a 2-barrel bluff, almost definitely have the best hand, and I do want to inflate this pot in position. The river bet is a shame as he was really close to calling. Could 1.5k be better against a bad player?