32Red Poker Blog

I had a great time last week over in Vegas, where I went for the Main Event. Unfortunately, very little of that fun came in the Main Event. I’ll do away with the suspense, as it wouldn’t last for long anyway. The event started badly on the first hand, and went downhill most of the way. There’s no point in complaining, however, and I wanted to invite you to look at some of the hands with me. I’d be really interested to know people’s thoughts. There were a couple of tough spots, but as for almost every tournament, I probably could have done better.

There was no time to breathe at the start, as I looked down at 99 on the very first hand. The player to my right limped, and so I raised the 100 blind to 400. This player completed the call, after the small blind had done the same. I was confident I was starting with the best hand, but obviously two players were drawing very live against me, with unknown hands. The board came 543 rainbow; my plan was to bet, and to insta-muck to any re-raise. I bet 1,000, the small blind called, and the other player got out of the way. Body language is a tough thing to describe, but here it made me confident I had the best hand. The turn came an offsuit ten, which was a near-complete blank, and so a great card. I bet 2,000, and the player called.

Anything wrong yet? Very possibly. Notice I said I was confident my hand was good on the flop, and therefore after the blank on the turn. Yet, my bet of 2,000 is actually quite small. Counting back, the pot contained 3,250, and so I had underbet it. In this spot, the overwhemingly most likely hand for my opponent to hold was a pair and flush draw (one of 77,66,22,65,75,64, etc). These hands have up to 13 outs against me, and little bet value on the end (By this, I mean that if the river had come another blank, I cannot extract too much of a value bet against these hands with my pair of nines). Therefore, a bigger bet would probably have been right.

The failure to make it highlighted for me one of the principle areas of my game that I need to work on. The samller bet I made combined the fact I was probably ahead with a slight fear I was behind, as the smaller bet gave me pot control. However, there are a few spots like this where I need to believe outright in my read, rather than balance the factors as I am used to doing on the internet.

The river came a 6, to make the board 54310. This was not the worst card (a 7,5 or 2 would have been), but it became a terrible card when the player in the small blind bet out 5,000, especially as his hand shook in excitement. A bluff was almost impossible in this spot, and I insta-mucked.

Things continued in a similar vein, and I went into the first break with a disappointing 15,000 from the 20,000 starting stack. I was not unhappy with the way I had played, and knew that if I caught one hand at this weak table, I could get back into the game. This hand came soon after, and with an interesting dynamic involved. The player UTG meant to raise the 100/200 blinds to 800, but faltered in his action, and threw only 400 over the line. This caused him to have two callers that he might not have had, and he was visibly slightly upset as it came round to me on the button, and I looked down at KK. I believe that an emotional player in this kind of spot is less likely to throw away their hand, in an attempt to rectify their mistake, and I planned to take full advantage of this. I re-raised the 400 to 1,600, and he threw in his call automatically. The other two players got out of the way, and so my bet size had worked perfectly. I knew his read on the situation would worngly be that I was trying to take advantage, and so I tried to continue this theme. I’ll explain what I mean by later when come to describe the turn action- it is something well worth thinking about against bad players. The flop came a perfect Q66. I bet 3,500 of my remaining 13,500, and the way he called gave me a good read that I was ahead of either KQ, or a medium pocket pair. There is always of course some danger I could be behind if he did hold a six in his hand or QQ, but I did not need to give too much thought to this.

The turn came an offsuit deuce. Often people talk about perfect cards as ones that give them a straight or a flush, but blanks can be just a strong. We were almost definitley playing a game of pair against pair with me in the lead, and a card to make my opponent comfortable about his hand was what I needed. So, how much did I bet? Nothing. I checked the turn.

This is a technique which can be reallt strong in this situation, and is what I call the delayed trap. It involves betting the flop, and checking the turn when it does not change the situation, with the intention of getting maximum value on the river. The value comes from the fact that your turn check completely disguises your hand, and invites your opponent to think that he has caught you bluffing on the flop. It needs a situation where the board is dry, and your opponent is not drawing, and it also needs your stack to be full compared to the pot size, so that you do not lose the vlaue of betting the turn and river. Here, my stack was actually just smaller than the pot, and so had it not been for the circumstances before the flop, I would have used the dealyed check anyway.

However, the situation gave me the perfect opening to make to follow this important idea of contuining the theme. Here’s my thinking of this one: bad players are bad, because they let their emotions get in the way of their thinking. They hate being outdrawn or having a bad run of cards, but most of all they hate being bluffed. Bad players can console themselves after most other outcomes, but bceome always paranoid about being bluffed. I believe they dislike even more being bluffed by a “kid,” but that’s another story.

Anyway, when a bad player makes a mistake like my opponent did before the flop, their levels of paranoia escalate. They are worried that someone will take advantage of it, and this is the exact situation they cannot deal with- someone might bluff them, and it could be their fault! I hoped I had put a worry in my opponent’s mind before the flop that I was trying to take advantage of his mistake, and so this had become the theme for the hand. If I could create a situation which made him go back to worrying about that, I knew that this worry would far outweigh reason, and his mind would do exactly what it wanted to do- it would become intent on this theme, and throw out any other reasoning.

My opponent may well have called all-in on the turn, but there was little danger in a check, and I really wanted to make sure I got full value. I wanted to see no ace, king (!) or queen on the river, and indeed it came a perfect five.

Emotions act quicker than reason in poker, and I wanted to hurry my opponent’s mind into a mistake by making an over-quick all-in when he checked. In fact, he bet out a small 2,000, and within a second, I had said “all-in,” and he had called. He turned over pocket jacks, and I was happy to see I had got it right.

I was up to 26,500, and was really excited about my situation in the tournament. Without too much time to breathe, I picked up pocket threes on the button with blinds of 150/300. Two players had limped before me. An American pro whos name I forget was the one good player at the table, and was raising alot limping into many pots, and the Dutch guy behind him was the one steady and solid player at the table. The small blind got out the way, and we were four way to the flop. It came a great 9d8d3c, and the action was checked to me. When I hit the bottom set, I always asy myself “what chances am I giving to an opponent having an overset.” The American pro did not worry me much, as I knew his raising range definitely included eights and nines. The Dutch guy had not given as much away, but I thought it was more likely than not that he would have raised these pairs with the serial limper behind him.

I bet 1,000, which was called by the American, and surprisingly check-raised to 3,600 by the Dutch player. Although he was playing 21,500, I knew that my decision point came now. It seemed impossible to re-raise and get away, and flat-calling would only postpone my decision if a blank came on the turn, and the Dutch player committed himself further. It was a tough spot, as I was sure that the check-raise represnted alot of strength. I was sure that the Dutch player would not make this move even with a big straight and flussh draw, and so realy he had one of three hands-98 for two pair, or a set of eights or nines. I suddenly did not like the spot.

I contemplated a flat-call, as it had the advantage that some cards on the turn would slow my opponent down. However, it seemed inevitable that the American was playing something like QdJd for a flush and gutshot draw, and so those action-stopping cards would only be the ones that gave him the lead!

I had a real dilemna, and made sure I gave myself time to think. The Dutch player definitely could have 99 or 88, but it seemed strange that he ahd not raised them before the flop. On the other hand, he seemed the kind of player to bet out two pair if that is what he had, especially with the draws out there. The maths was no help, as it told me that the chance of 98 is about the same (just slightly more) than the combined chance of 99 or 88, and I was forced to choose the most likely of two unlikely situations. I made the wrong choice.

I re-raised to committ myself, the chips flew in, and he turned over a set of nines. 5,000 chips left me at the mercy of the poker gods, and they offered me no help an hour later as I went out with AQ against AK. That was almost irrelevant; the tournament had come down really to this one crucial hand. Could I have saved myself? I’d love to know what you think.

The depth of the chip stacks meant it wasn’t one of those situations wher I could say there was nothing I could do. I would like to think that I may have been able to fold the set, but for the one factor pulling in the opposite direction- my opponent had somewhat disguised his hand by not raising before the flop. There is a lot in favour of the laydown here, and it leads to a bizarre and interesting conclusion.

I had limped in before the flop for that one in eight chance of hitting my miracle set. Having got lucky to do so, we are really saying that I should have thought about passing, based just on one check raise? That seems to suggest there is little value in playing the 3s in the first place. After alot of thinking, this is the only reasonable answer I can come up with of how to avoid this spot- very possibly, limping with small pairs is too dangerous when the stacks are so deep, because of the small risk of the killer set under set.

So, over to you. I really want to get a lot of interaction going on this blog, in the form of comments, polls and questions. Be nasty if you want- let me know what you think, and let me know on this poll:

Could I have got away from my set under set on the 983 board. If so, how?

-No, it’s unavoidable

- Yes, you should pass to the check-raise.

-Yes, you should call the raise, and get out if he fires again.

-You should control the pot by betting less on the flop.

-You should never play the hand.

Thanks for your thoughts!